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ABSTRACT Application repackaging is a severe problem for Android systems. Many Android malware
programs pass the mobile platform fundamental security barriers through repackaging other legitimate apps.
Most of the existing anti-repackaging schemes only work at the Android DEX bytecode level, but not for
the shared object files consisting of native ARM-based machine instructions. Lacking the protection at the
native machine code level opens a door for attackers to launch repackaging attacks on the shared libraries that
are commonly used on Android apps. This paper presents CodeCloak, a novel anti-repackaging system to
protect Android apps at the native code level. CodeCloak employs binary-level code virtualization techniques
to protect the target application. At the native machine code level, it uses a newly designed stack-based
virtualization structure to obfuscate and protect critical algorithm implementations that have been compiled
into native instructions. It leverages multiple dynamic code protection schemes to increase the diversity of
the program behavior at runtime, aiming to increase the difficulties for performing code reverse engineering.
We evaluate CodeCloak under typical app repackaging scenarios. Experimental results show that CodeCloak
can effectively protect apps against repackaging attacks at the cost of minimum overhead.
INDEX TERMS Android code protection, code obfuscation, app repackaging, code virtulization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Application repackaging is a prevalent and severe threat to
the Android ecosystem. With the help of dynamic profiling
and reverse engineering tools, an attacker can unpack an app,
replace and insert code to, e.g., remove advertisements, steal
privacy information, or make purchases without the user’s
authorization [1]. A prior study shows that over 80% of the
malware samples were implemented through repacking legit-
imate apps [2]. Therefore, there is a critical need to protect
Android apps from repackaging attacks.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving
it for publication was Bora Onat.
Code obfuscation is a viable means to protect appli-
cations against reverse engineering and repackaging [3].
By creating code that preserves the intention and semantics
of the original code but is challenging to understand, code
obfuscation increases the time and efforts for performing
code reverse engineering. There is considerable work in
applying code obfuscation to protect Android applications
against repackaging. In Figure 1, we summarize some of
the most relevant work. Many of the previous approaches
target at the Android DEX bytecode level. Proguard [4] and
DexGuard [5] are two representative work, which, however,
cannot effectively protect the obfuscated code if the entry
point (such as the memcpy method) is found using tools like
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FIGURE 1. Summary of prior code protection schemes their corresponding attacks for Android apps. Here, different color blocks represent
levels of different risks. A red color indicates high risk while the green suggests the risk to be low. Most protection systems do not target
the binary level.
DexExtractor [6]. Other implementations overwrite the way a
DEX file is loaded by changing the Android DEX class loader,
aiming to increase the difficulties for observing standard
function calls. However, an attacker can still bypass such a
defense by debugging the native commands through tools
like ZjDroid [7] or DexHunter [8] to observe standard library
calls. DIVILAR [9] was able to protect apps against function
call observations, but it is proven to be vulnerable under
more advanced tools like PackGrind [10] that can decrypt
and reconstruct the mapping between code semantics and
function calls.
In addition to DEX files, there are many Android apps
built upon shared libraries which were firstly written in
high-level languages like C and C++ and then compiled
into native machine instructions. These shared libraries often
implemented the frequently used core algorithms. Therefore,
there is a need to protect share object (SO) files against code
reverse engineering and app repackaging. However, existing
SO protection schemes often adopt a simple but less effective
code obfuscation or encryption strategy. They do not pro-
vide sufficient protection against sophisticated code reverse
engineering attacks. For example, UPX shelling [11] is one
of such protection methods, but an attacker can use the UPX
Shell tools [12] to launch the attack as shown in Figure 1.
OLLVM confusion [13] is compiler-based code obfuscation
performed at the source code level, but it is proven to be
vulnerable under new anti-obfuscation methods [14], [15].
This paper aims to propose a better code obfuscation
approach forSOfiles. Our work targets applications compiled
for the ARM instruction set, a de-facto Android hardware
architecture. As a departure from prior work, our code obfus-
cation scheme, namely CodeCloak, works at the binary level.
It employs a stack-based virtualization scheme to protect the
logic of algorithms and protocols implemented in SO files.
At the native machine code level, it uses a novel stack-based
virtualization structure to protect native ARM instructions.
To enhance the security strength, we adopt multiple virtual
protection schemes, where a scheme is dynamically cho-
sen at runtime. Furthermore, our implementation is fully
compatible with existing protection schemes for DEX. As a
result, CodeCloak closes the gap between DEX and SO file
protection.
We evaluate CodeCloak under typical app repackaging
settings. Our evaluation results show that CodeCloak can
effectively protect apps from repackaging attacks, and it
achieves this at the cost of minimum overhead. One of the
key contributions of this paper is a novel approach for pro-
tecting native share object files against app repackaging on
Android systems. The other contribution is the first approach
for binary-level code virtualization for ARM instructions, and
it can be applied to many embedded systems that are powered
by ARM processor architectures.
II. BACKGROUND
A. VM-BASED ANDROID APP PROTECTION SHCEME
The VM protection process consists of the following steps.
We first decompile the binary SO file and extract the
key ARM instructions according to the pre-set tags. Then,
the extracted ARM instructions are mapped to virtual instruc-
tions which are still turning equivalent. Next, the virtual
instructions are encoded into the SO file in a binary form
utilizing the custom encoding rules. Finally, the combined
custom interpreter is inserted in a binary SO file. By using
these strategies over the binary SO file as it is shown above,
the VM-based protection scheme will effectively increase the
attack cost of the attacker.
To illustrate operations of the scheme, we take
DIVILAR [9] as an example. DIVILAR is a VM-based
protection method, and it converts the real instructions into a
virtual instruction set and adds a hook mechanism to restore
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FIGURE 2. Comparison before and after reverse peeling. Red-marked
instructions represent encrypted, unrecognized instructions.
and interpret the virtual instructions at runtime. Although
DIVILAR provides protection only in the level of DEX file,
it also proves that the VM-based security method is effective
against common countermeasures, including static analysis,
dynamic analysis, and specific analysis for virtual machines.
Before showing the SO protection crack example, we must
point out that the most significant difference between the
scheme of CodeCloak and DIVILAR is the protection objects
are completely inconsistent. The object protected by DIVI-
LAR is the DEX file, while our system protects the lower level
SO file. Due to VM protection running in DEX file, DIVILAR
must use a hook mechanism to communicate within com-
ponents. However, it is a design defect that an attacker can
utilize this mechanism to obtain information between instruc-
tions during the translation process. CodeCloak works in the
level of SO file and avoids problems caused by the instruction
restoration process when the program is interpreted.
B. SO PROTECTION CRACK EXAMPLE
As mentioned above in Figure 1, we have understood that
SO file protection scheme is more effective than that of DEX
file, but we would like to know the existing method could
take protection effective or not? To ameliorate our doubts,
as described next, we will manually attack several common
protection methods in SO files. Here we use the interactive
disassembler IDA Pro [16] to dynamically debug and analyze
SO files.
At present, the particular protection scheme of SO files
mainly employ encryption, as we all know, the deformation
of UPX shell [11] is one of the most commonly used forms
above in existing app reinforcement manufacturers. Here we
take the SO file protected by Ijiami [17] as the attacking
object. Figure 2 (a) shows partial instructions of the protected
function stringFromJNI.
As we can see, for the entire instructions are encrypted
and erroneous, it is very confusing for the adversary to
understand the semantics of the code section. However, as a
skillful cracker, he/she could first analyze the loading mech-
anism of the SO file, then create a dump point before the
.init/.init_array in the memory. Contrary to static
analysis attacks, this method could fix the corresponding
load, dynamic, and section fields. After this series of oper-
ations, Figure 2 (b) shows the repaired StringFromJNI
method opened with IDA Pro.
OLLVM obfuscation is accomplished by hiding the real
control flow of the application. We choose the SO file pro-
tected by Tencent Legu [18] as the attacking target where the
JNI_Onload method in the SO file is confused.
To implement the attack, the adversary directly set the
breakpoint at .init/.init_array, he/she can debug
and decrypt the JNI_Onload method function. Using this
method, we can obtain new_JNI_Onload that is a new
‘‘load’’ function decrypted from JNI_Onload. Alterna-
tively, the cracker can use the replacement cookie (Dalvik
mode) or modify the source code (ART mode) to attack, and
finally repair the dumped file while getting the decrypted
info. Hence, in this case, we can draw a clear conclusion
that the obfuscation based on OLLVM is more difficult to be
debugged than the UPX shell, but experienced attackers can
still bypass these protection mechanisms through dynamic
debugging.
These two crack cases show that it is urgent to persevere a
protectionmethod to prevent both static analysis and dynamic
debugging. Attack experiments of this paper in section IV
show that CodeCloak can prevent a cracker from conducting
above two kinds of breakdown, and even prevent special
attacks on virtual machines.
C. THE ATTACK MODEL
The existing research [19] has illustrated the reverse steps of
the VM-protected program. Here we summarize as follows:
Step 1: to find the confused entry point address of the
VM interpreter;
Step 2: to find the address of the dispatcher and
restore the handlers executed at runtime, record the handler
addresses. The cracker will discover the mapping relationship
between the virtual and the real instructions;
Step 3: using the knowledge obtained from the first two
steps to recover the logic of the target code region. These steps
are the basic operations for an attacker to launch an attack.
Our attack model assumes that attackers have practical
experience in software reverse engineering. We assume that
attackers can use our protection program to protect any
Android applications multiple times in a specific application
environment. We also assume that attackers can debug, track,
and modify binary SO files in memory through analysis tools
such as IDA Pro [16] and Valgrind [20]. In a word, the pur-
pose of the attackers is to implement the attacks through the
analysis of VM’s working mechanism and the transformation
logic between instructions. Contrary to the purpose of the
attackers, our goal is to protect VM’s working principles and
mapping schemes between instructions from being discov-
ered by using as reliable protections as possible.
III. DESIGN OF CODECLOAK
A. OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
To address the problems of repackaging attacks, we propose
a system which we coin CodeCloak, a native ARM instruc-
tion virtualized system for Android apps. The purpose of
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FIGURE 3. Overview of CodeCloak. The middle area highlighted by gray rectangle shows ARM stack-based virtualization, including
pre-processing, key instruction extraction, multiple virtualizations, building and embedding the interpreter VMSection. The VMSection is
executed as following steps: ¬ Jump into the virtual machine; ­ Initialize the VM, enter the Dispatcher; ® Read the virtual instruction
bytecodes; ¯ Dispatch handlers to process bytecodes; ° Exit the virtual machine; ± Go to the subsequent instructions to continue
execution.
CodeCloak is to provide protection for Android applications
at the lower and deeper binary code levels.
Figure 3 depicts the overall system architecture of Code-
Cloak. It takes the APK as input and binds the virtualized
binary file to the compiled APK as output. As mentioned
above, CodeCloak focuses on protection policies of Android
native SO files, including the original SO file and the shell file
after DEX protection such as DIVILAR [9]. We can divide
CodeCloak’s protection process into multiple virtualization
modules and construct custom interpreter engine modules.
The former is to convert the original ARM instructions into
the virtualized instructions by selecting a mapping rule from
multiple sets of the custommapping conversion rules, and the
latter constructs the interpreter which interprets and executes
virtualized instructions while the program is running.
B. ARM VIRTUAL-MACHINE-BASED PROTECTION
Unlike the Java virtual machine, CodeCloak is a stack-based
virtualization protection scheme for ARM instructions. This
protection scheme can be implemented through the following
two phases: (1) utilizing multiple virtualization module to
perform code translation, and (2) creating a custom inter-
preter engine.
In the first phase, CodeCloak rewrites the instructions to a
new form, which inserts mapping tables, atomic handles, and
then packages.apk static file. To be specific, the systemfirst
disassembles the keyHEX and get theARM instructions from
the pre-set label code segments or the start and end addresses
of Guest.apk. After applying these mapping rules, the sys-
tem could transform the native instructions into the virtu-
alized formats one by one. Concerning these two types are
Turing-equivalent; in general, we usually employ multiple
custom instructions to simulate a single native instruction.
As Figure 3 shows, we can quickly draw the conclusion
that the mapping rules are very important. To avoid being
cracked, multiple sets of mapping rules and corresponding
interpretation handlers are designed, which instead of a single
mapped ARM virtual machine. Using the method above,
every original protected instruction can be converted to vir-
tual instructions of different code sets each time.
In the second stage, CodeCloak implements a global
abstract interpretation engine VMSection in a protected
SO file. VMSection can be considered as a code pump,
which is accomplished by simulating various kinds of
schedule functions on real CPU. VMSection contains
six components: the converted custom virtual instructions
VMData, the initialize program VMInit, the register
environment VMContext, the virtual machine’s scheduler
Dispatcher, the exit program HD_Exit, and the corre-
sponding operations Handlers. VMSection embeds SO
files in binary form.Worthy of note is that the beginning of the
code region will be filled with B VM and junk instructions to
erase the traces of the original execution. Finally, CodeCloak
outputs a brand new virtualized SO file.
Thus, in summary, if an attacker wants to crack this kind of
virtualization mechanism, he/she must grasp all information
completely through the internal working principles of the
custom interpreter and the functions of each virtual instruc-
tion. Meanwhile, he/she has to restore the original functions
of the running virtual instructions, which is a cumbersome
and error-prone process that can easily trigger the domino
effect.
C. TIME DIVERSITY
Time diversity is one of CodeCloak’s design goals, and which
devotes the system to build multiple sets of bytecode instruc-
tion and handlers during the protection code executing. Once
the system generates multiple instruction sets, the Dispatcher
randomly selects one type of those to perform every round.
In contrast, the classic VM protection scheme [21] uses
the dispatcher to acquire and parse the compiled byte-
code instructions during execution. We must point out that
the fetched instructions set are unaltered; in other words,
the operation code of bytecode instructions is delivered over
to a fixed handler. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence
between custom instructions and interpreters, the attacker can
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TABLE 1. An example of NI and corresponding structure.
quickly get the mapping rules of the real instructions and the
virtual instructions.
We address all of these issues in prior VM protection
scheme and provide empirical evidence of our ability to
solve problems beyond the reach of previous methods. Code-
Cloak establishes mapping tables between multiple sets of
custom instructions and interpreters at the same time. We
automatically generate many alternative implementations for
each handler. These implementations can generate equivalent
results for the original input instructions. Finally, the pro-
tected program will randomly select a mapping table to
execute with the Dispatcher and handlers of the interpreter.
As a simple example consider the following add instruc-
tion, in this case, this native instruction mainly completes the
add operation of the r0 register and r1 register, and the sum
will be restored in the r0 register. These operations will be
divided into load_reg, vadd, and store virtual instruc-
tions after being virtualized by CodeCloak. The load_reg
instruction is used to push the operand to the stack, and the
store instruction is used to pop the stack and store the result
in the VMContext. According to different encoding rules,
the virtual instructions are randomly encoded into one of the
three bytecode formats as shown in Table 1. At the same
time, we generate corresponding sets of handlers for each
VM which are functionally equivalent in nature. However,
the same bytecodes have differentmeanings in different VMs.
We would like to add that the number of VMs is flexible
according to the runtime performance overhead and protec-
tion strength of the app. A protected applicationwith diversity
and uncertainty can easily invalidate the knowledge gained by
an adversary from previous reverse attacks.
D. AN EXAMPLE
1) PROTECTION PROCESS
To illustrate how CodeCloak protects the APK, we have
selected a partial code snippet of 2048.apk [22] to explain
the protection process. The steps of CodeCloak’s protection
process are described as follows.
Step 1: As shown in Figure 4, we first unzip the appli-
cation installation package to get the binary SO file, then
disassemble it to select the key code segment. To simplify the
problem, we assume that the code fragment has a starting off-
set address 0x17A8 and an ending offset address 0x19B8.
FIGURE 4. Decompile key code segments to be protected.
FIGURE 5. Schematic diagram of handlers embedded in VMs under
custom configuration and the same striped boxes represent the
functionally equivalent handler.
Step 2: Next, the ARM instructions of the segments
being protected are virtualized one by one. As mentioned
above, using encoding rules, the designed scheme will ran-
domly select and embed the virtual instructions from the
multiple sets into the VMData in binary bytecode format.
Step 3: Generate the correspondingVMaccording to the
custom configuration choice. As shown in Figure 5, if the
configuration choice is VM_2, it will automatically generate
a functionally equivalent implementation for each handler.
In fact, for each running, every VM has different handles
execution sequences, and the mapping tables between the
virtual instructions and the handlers are also highly dynamic.
Namely, the control flow undergoes continuous changes.
Step 4: In order to cover up the real jumping entry
point of the virtual machine, the obfuscation is implemented
with the insertion of garbage instructions at the associated
particular location in the binary.
Step 5: The system embeds a new code fragment
VMSection into the SO file. VMSection is composed of
VMInit, VMData, several VM structures just established,
etc.
Step 6: In the last step, the system repackages the
new app. The function of the newly generated version
new_2048.apk is equivalent to the pre-protection one.
2) RUNTIME EXECUTION FLOW
To illustrate how a protected app executes, we use the newly
generated new_2048.apk as an example. In what follows,
we describe the technical details of our case.
Step 1: When new_2048.apk executes to the pro-
tected code segment, the B VM instruction is executed first.
As described in Figure 3, the protected application jumps to
VMInit component to initialize the virtual machine. Specif-
ically, for the correct restoration after completing executions
of protected instructions, the values of the register in the
current runtime environment are saved to VMContext for
simulating the behavior of the real CPU register.
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FIGURE 6. The scheduling process of the dispatcher.
Step 2: After the VMContext is initialized, the
Dispatcher executes the instruction bytecodes in the
VMData. For the bytecodes have been virtualized, Code-
Cloak needs to choose a corresponding set of VMs to perform
in accordance with the coding rules of the virtual instructions.
As can be seen in Figure 6, here we choose the first set of
rules (VM_1) to explain. Once a decision has been made in
the choice of VM, we will further select the corresponding
handler to execute based on the parsed opcode. Let us take
the add instruction parsing process in Figure 6 as an example,
the R7 register points to the address of VMData. After
parsing the content of the R7 register, the program starts
executing the handler with the offset address 0x3F36C.
Step 3: The interpreter of VM starts to select and execute
the first handler. For one original instruction is mapped into
semantic equivalents in several virtual ones, the system will
execute multiple handlers. As shown in Figure 6, when an
epoch successfully completes execution, the program jumps
to the Dispatcher’s entrance address 0x3F2E0.
Step 4: Inside the loop, the program executes the byte in
VMData. Once all the bytecodes are fetched out, the control
jumps to take Step 5 otherwise repeats Step 2.
Step 5: After interpreting and executing all VMData
bytecodes, the program jumps to HD_Exit, the function of
this point is to restore the latest VMContext values to the
real registers.
Step 6: The program jumps back to the end point address
of the protected code segment and continues performing out-
side instructions of the virtual machine.
IV. EVALUATION
CodeCloak provides effective protection on the binary level
for Android apps against repacking. In this section, we com-
prehensively evaluate the effectiveness of CodeCloak by ana-
lyzing the security and performance of applications protected
by CodeCloak.
A. GENERAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of CodeCloak
from two aspects. On the one hand, CodeCloak uses atomic
operations to interpret the core instructions of the app to
be protected. This is difficult for prior attacking methods
to repack the protected app because atomic operations carry
TABLE 2. Comparison of mainstream reinforcement.
FIGURE 7. Disassembly of the new .nisl code segments after
virtualization.
TABLE 3. Dynamic shelling tools and features.
little semantic information. On the other hand, we analyze the
app protected by CodeCloak and six popular commercial pro-
tection tools. Table 2 shows the results of the analysis, which
shows that CodeCloak is the only one protection approach to
use the multi-virtualization technique to protect SO files.
B. STATIC ANALYSIS
Before launching an attack on protected apps, the adversary
often uses static analysis tools to collect some valuable infor-
mation which contributes to repack apps. These tools typi-
cally are disassemblers such as JEB [23] and Apktool [24]
that can parse DEX file to Java source code, or those such as
IDA Pro [16] that can parse SO files to ARM instructions.
JNI_OnLoad, often regarded as a potential vulnerabil-
ity by the cracker, primarily exists in all apps as an entry
of native layer functions. As shown in Figure 7, when the
JNI_OnLoad function is debugged in IDA Pro, we can see
that the new .nisl section abounds with lost of atomic
operations for the handler. Therefore it is useless for the
cracker to establish a complete logical relationship with static
analysis.
C. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS BY MEANS OF UNPACKING TOOLS
As shown in Table 3, up to the present, we have collected six
representative shelling tools. Next, the most recent three of
them will be chosen as test cases for system resistance.
DexHunter [8]
DexHunter is an automatic unpacking tool for
Android DEX files. The main idea is to fully restore
instructions in memory during class initialization. More
in details, it directly modifies the Android source
codes (Android 4.4.3) and replaces the original con-
tent in art/runtime/class_linker.cc (ART)
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anddalvik/vm/native/dalvik_system_DexFile
.cpp (DVM) to own customized codes, to actively load and
initialize the classes in all DEX files before system invoking
dvmDefineClass.
As above mentioned, without loading and initializing the
upper DEX Java layer, the methods virtualized by the Code-
Cloak system are processed directly at the native layer. It is
lower than the DexHunter’s unpacking point, so we draw
a clear conclusion that DexHunter can not break through the
barrier of CodeCloak.
PackerGrind [10]
PackerGrind, a novel adaptive unpacking system, mon-
itors the protected app from the runtime, system, instruction
layer then recovers the DEX files according to the collected
data. In runtime, PackerGrind tracks the process of parsing
DEX files, loading classes, resolving methods, and executing
methods. This runtime tracking does not work in the app pro-
tected by CodeCloak because our protected app does not have
the operation of shelling and DEX restoration. At the same
time, some system functions likememcpy(),strcpy() are
tracked in PackerGrind to monitor the memory operation,
even at the instruction level. Apps protected by CodeCloak,
however, do not involve the memory operation of the data
in DEX file, so PackerGrind can not monitor the useful data
when app running.
DroidUnpack [25]
We further use the advanced unpacking system
DroidUnpack for the security evaluation of CodeCloak.
As far as we know, DroidUnpack is a powerful reverse anal-
ysis tool, it can set up multiple unpacking detection points,
including the hidden code extraction, self-modifying code
detection, and multi-layer unpacking detection. However,
the protection methods involved in CodeCloak do not use
the trick of shells, and the scheme does not comprise a set
of packing and unloading, so the DroidUnpack’s shelling
monitoring point is invalid. We should point out that another
important function in DroidUnpack is the detection of the
JNI reflection interface. Although JNI related API calls can
be detected in the protected APK file, it is still problemat-
ical to restore and modify the instructions due to diversity
virtualization, not to mention repackaging.
D. MANUAL DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
We have performed static and dynamic analysis tools to
evaluate CodeCloak, and this part will further describe the
manual attack process [19] in details.
To intuitively analyze the reverse time cost of protected
applications, we first visualize the whole attacking processes
as the model shown in Figure 8, then we will apply this model
to specify our test case.
At the beginning of an attack process, it is possible for
an adversary to encounter some anti-debugging obstacles
in P1, P2. Suppose that the probability of encountering
anti-debugging obstacles in P1,P2 is p1, p2, respectively; the
number of anti-debugging mechanisms is N1,N2, respec-
tively. Assume that the time required for an attacker to pass
FIGURE 8. A formal model for manually reverse attack was proposed.
In this model, from P0 to P3, it indicates several states that occur during
manual dynamic analysis of protected Android applications.
an anti-debug is Tx, and the state after P2 is to enter a state
of the virtual machine, in other words, the method we protect
is the Java_com_XXX method. Since diversity protection
is introduced here, an attacker may randomly select one of
the three paths during the attack. We assume that the attacker
chooses path 2 here, and assume that the attacker needs Tt
time to find the mapping between a virtual bytecode and the
original instruction. So the time required to get to the state P3
is as follows:
t1 = t0+ p1 ∗ (Tx ∗ N1), (0 < p1 ≤ 1), (1)
t2 = t1+ p2 ∗ (Tx ∗ N2)+ (Ttn)m, (0 < p2 ≤ 1), (2)
where n represents the number of virtual instructions; m
represents the number of mapping tables between virtual
instructions and original instructions.
Therefore, the total time cost will be as follows:
Tall= t0+(p1 ∗ (Tx ∗ N1))+(p2 ∗ (Tx ∗ N2))+(Ttn)m, (3)
It can be seen from equation 3 that the total time cost
required by the attacker is equal to the time cost of bypassing
the normal anti-debugging plus the time cost of breaking the
virtual machine. Due to the introduction of the diversified
virtual machine principle, the attacker’s attack cost increases
exponentially. If we also virtualize the JNI_OnLoad and
Java_com_XXX methods at the same time, t1 and t2 will
increase more significantly.
After a short discussion of model formation, specifically,
we will evaluate the security of our protection scheme
through a certain scale of attack experiments. Participants in
the program are 22 students from the host institution who are
pursuing a degree in computer network security. Among the
22 students, 20 are masters and 2 are doctors. 10 of them are
women and 12 are men. The 22 attackers need to complete
the following three tasks within the specified 48 hours:
115068 VOLUME 7, 2019
Z. He et al.: Exploiting Binary-Level Code Virtualization to Protect Android Applications
TABLE 4. Number of completions and average time cost per task.
FIGURE 9. Data flow diagram before and after confusion by OLLVM. The
entry is the native swipeRight method, and the altered refers to bogus
logic.
Task 1: Given conventional anti-debugging and obfus-
cation mechanisms, find the entry point address of the real
VM interpreter.
Task 2: Given the entry address of the VM interpreter,
find the entry address of the scheduler.
Task 3: Given the scheduler’s entry address, find and
record the order, address, and content of handlers.
The three tasks describe the process that an adversary will
face when attempting to complete attack steps. The fewer
the number of task people completes, the more reliable the
protection of the solution performs. In addition, in order to
specify the level of attack difficulty, we count the average
time that attackers ended each task. In a word, the longer
each task takes, the more difficult CodeCloak makes it for
an attacker. Table 4 shows the completion of each task.
The table shows that eighteen volunteers have completed
task 1. Since all participants have some reverse experi-
ence, it is easy to find the entry address of the real VM inter-
preter. However, there are only nine volunteers to complete
task 2 because the virtual machine’s dynamic scheduling
mechanism makes it difficult for them to track. We apply
the existing detection algorithms [26], [27] to measure the
ARM instructions similarity between the handlers extracted
by each volunteer and the pre-protection code segments.
We record the total number of handlers collected in task 2
and task 3.
As shown in Table 5, most volunteers cannot extract and
restore the complete instruction set. Only three volunteers
extract all the handlers with over 95% instruction similarity.
We must point out that many volunteers mistake that they
obtain all the instruction sets. In fact, only part of those
TABLE 5. The number of handlers collected by different attackers and the
similarity of instructions.
instructions could be got because of multiple sets of virtu-
alization mechanisms(our configuration here is 3). At last,
we consider that three volunteers could complete all the attack
tasks.
These results lead to a further study finding more details
about time cost. We delved into the average time cost and
the reason why some volunteers can complete each task.
Table 4 shows that the average time cost of anti-debugging by
18 attackers is 7.5 hours. The average time cost of breaking
the virtual machine mechanism is the sum of 9.9 hours to
complete task 2 and 29.3 hours to complete task 3. Consider-
ing that most people do not complete task 2 and task 3,
the real time cost will only be greater.
E. VIRTUAL SPECIFIC ANALYSIS
In the past few years, code obfuscation based on virtualization
has exhibited a general trend in software protection. However,
at present, some well-designed attacks also involve breaking
these protections. It can be viewed at least from the following
two aspects.
1) REVERSE ENGINEER VM-BASED PROTECTION
In the case of CodeCloak protection, we take Rolles’s
scheme as a typical example to evaluate security against
reverse attack. As an adversary, he/she will try his/her
best to obtain code execution and data processing of
VMSection.However, the diversity of virtualization makes
it very difficult to crack and restore protected APKs.Wemust
point out that this kind of attack method for virtualization
protection is based on the process of interpreting the execu-
tion of bytecodes. So a conclusion can be easily drawn that
attackers must be familiar with the principle and structure
of the entire code virtualization protection in advance. This
means, in simple words, after parsing and semantic anal-
ysis of VMSection, an adversary still needs to generate
the platform-dependent machine code that is similar to the
pre-virtualized code. And the diversity of the CodeCloak
protection process will defend virtual machine attacks.
2) VM REPLACEMENT ATTACK
The key of the scheme Sudeep Ghosh is to replace
the VMSection module of the protection program with
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FIGURE 10. Using multi-virtualization protection or not: (a) The red nodes and the green nodes respectively refer to the APIs of the DEX layer and the
native layer’s ARM instruction blocks containing jumps and call relationships. (c) The green, blue, and yellow nodes refer to the native layer’s ARM
instruction blocks generated by CodeCloak’s first, second, and third protections, respectively. The red nodes and the black nodes refer to the APIs of the
DEX layer and the same instruction blocks generated after three protections.
the attack VM component. Once accomplishing this step,
an adversary could analyze the dynamic running state of
the application in memory. In fact, the basic premise behind
this attack strategy is that the VMSection is not anchored
sufficiently to the execution environment, that is to say,
the VM needs to exist in the running environment as a
single module. However, as mentioned above, VMSection
in CodeCloak-protected application is embedded in SO
files rather than independent. Therefore, the high coupling
relationship between VMSection and SO files effectively
prevents this attack method above.
F. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
1) DATA FLOW DIAGRAM ANALYSIS
Complexity in the data flow diagram (DFD) is critical to
evaluate the security. In this section, we utilize the application
function call graph before and after protection. Applying
Androguard [28] to get the function call graph gexf of the
DEX layer for 2048.apk [22], we run the python script
to analyze the APIs of a protected code segment. Use IDA
Pro [16] to record the native layer call relationship manually
and then build the block call graph gexf, finally use the
Gephi tool [29] to parse the gexf files.
Fig 10 (a) shows the result of parsing gexf for the native
layer and the DEX layer before protection. DEX APIs are
displayed as red, and the native layer’s ARM instruction
blocks containing jumps and call relationships are marked in
green. There are a total of 93 DEX layer APIs and 12 native
layer blocks. Figure 10 (b) give a partial detail view of
Figure 10 (a) with some tags. Figure 10 (c) is a schematic
diagram of the analysis results after protection by CodeCloak.
The yellow, green, and blue nodes describe several ARM
instruction blocks that contain jumps in the native layer after
three executions, 40 blocks of native level are generated
in each protection round. Compared with the simple bogus
control flow and control flow flattening of the OLLVM [13]
shown in Figure 9, there are almost completely different
blocks calling graph in every protection round, for an adver-
sary, must plan well, get information, finish one attack at
a time; or she/he should know every possible running blocks
sequence. Without doing this a successful attack cannot be
guaranteed.
2) DIVERSITY EVALUATION
One of CodeCloak’s design goals is to increase the diversity
of program execution. To evaluate this goal, we record the
offset addresses and orders of the first hundred handlers
called at each run. The intuition behind this planning is that
if the program has different execution address offsets per
round, an adversary would hardly complete tracking and
debugging. Applying 2048.apk [22] as a test program,
we run the protection system ten times. In order to collect
dynamic location information, we use IDA Pro [16] to debug
the protected application and manually collect the addresses
of the handlers.
As shown in Figure 11. For one protection, the 100 handler
offset addresses collected have changed a lot. However, for
ten protections, only 83 of the 10,00 nodes are entirely
overlapped. We can quickly draw reasonable conclusions:
CodeCloak-protected codes exhibit strong non-deterministic
behavior in one run; The offset addresses of the handlers at
each runtime are basically different. In other words, it is dif-
ficult for an attacker to use the previously collected runtime
information to perform reverse engineering.
G. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the overhead of CodeCloak in
terms of time and space complexity. The time complexity
includes the startup time of the apps, and the space complex-
ity consists of the size of the apps and the overall memory
consumption at runtime. In order to make the experiments
more convincing, we obeyed the following principles in the
selection process of the test apps: Firstly, we selected the
apps containing the binary SO file as much as possible,
which provide protected objects for the CodeCloak system.
Secondly, the selected apps must be popular enough, and
each app has more than 1,000,000 downloads in Google Play.
Finally, the selected apps must cover most of the application
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FIGURE 11. Time diversity after protection by CodeCloak. The horizontal axis represents the scheduling order of the partial handlers, and the
vertical axis represents the position offset of the handler.
TABLE 6. Information about App collection set.
categories defined by Google Play, such as tools, games, etc.
Details about them are shown in Table 6.
Our experimental platform is a Google Nexus 5 smart-
phone with Android version 4.4.2. We use Tencent’s GT
tool [30] for testing. The work of DSVMP [19] suggests
that the performance overhead of 5 VM configurations is
moderate in a virtual machine protection system, so we use
CodeCloak with 5 VM configurations in our experiments.
The size of the protected APK is an important indica-
tor. With that general outlook, it follows that if a protected
program increases the size heavily, the system CodeCloak
will be limited in many applications. As can be seen from
Figure 12, the protectedAPK size has increased by an average
of 23.79%. That is because VMSection is embedded in
the ELF file. At the same time, we found that the growth
rates for different APK sizes vary widely. For example,
2048.apk [22] increased by 42.80% but Lifelog.apk
[31] by 11.49%. The reason is that the growth of each APK
is only related to VMSection. So we think that if the orig-
inal program is smaller or approximately the same size as
VMSection, it could be the high growth rate. In another
word, if the size of the APK itself is small, the volume of the
APK caused by VMSection will increase significantly, and
vice versa. The volume of 2048.apk and Lifelog.apk
before protection are 2.9MB and 17.0MB respectively. The
overall volume increase is acceptable relative to the size of
the application itself, and the size of the APK can be reduced
by a series of slimming methods.
Next, we evaluate how CodeCloak affects memory con-
sumption and perform 100 protections in each sample. The
result shows that the memory consumption after virtualiza-
tion increases by an average of 17.61%. It is acceptable
relative to the importance of the algorithm in the program.
Figure 12 shows overhead of application start time ranges
from 1.28% to 7.33%, with an average of 4.08%. All pro-
tected apps start in less than 1 second on our platform, which
is modest.
Due to the different protection objects, we compare per-
formance evaluations with two commercial systems involv-
ing SO protection: UPX shell [11] and OLLVM-based
Hikari [32] rather than DIVILAR [9]. Table 7 shows that in
terms of volume growth, the Hikari-confused apps have a
significant code expansion rate up to 50%, but CodeCloak
only has slightly increased the size of the protected code
segment compared to its peers. As for memory consumption,
the average cost of Hikari-confused apps is 1.52 times that
of the original programs, while the UPX shell is similar to
CodeCloak. In the startup time, the CodeCloak with 5 VMs
performs better than the other two protection systems. Dif-
ferent from common packer protection, CodeCloak has no
process of decryption and unpacking at startup. Therefore,
less time is spent processing load. As a result, the time
complexity and space complexity perform better to some
extent.
V. RELATED WORK
Research in this field mainly focuses on the detection
and preventing of repackaged apps. AdRob [33] is the
first large scale study on the characteristics of cloned
mobile applications and their impact on the original devel-
opers. Repackaging detection based on code similarity
includes [34]–[37]. Other malicious behavior detectionmeth-
ods include Apposcopy [38], NDroid [39] and [40].
In repacking prevention, obfuscation, packaging, and
encryption are often used, but they can just defend against
static analysis instead of dynamic reverse engineering [41].
In addition, AppInk [42] uses softwarewatermark technology
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FIGURE 12. This figure shows the growth rate of file size, memory, and startup time of several apps protected by CodeCloak.
TABLE 7. Comparing with the average performance of apps protected by
the prior work.
to tame app repackaging. Converting Java layer code to
more complex native C/C++ implementations is more
advanced [43]. Reference [44] analyzes how different meth-
ods of protection, namely class encryption and usage of
native code, affect decompilation of Android apps. Wu Zhou
converted Davilk instructions into virtual instructions, and
explained the instructions by Hook mechanism [9].
An increasing number of developers usually put the critical
logic in the native shared library in C/C++ implementation,
the security of SO file needs to be solved urgently. Native
code obfuscation based on LLVM compiler [13] makes it
difficult for reverse engineering, but source-level process-
ing is often difficult to operate, and other OLLVM-based
approaches [45], [46] have the same problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce CodeCloak, a new method of
native ARM instruction virtualization protection based on
time diversity. It can effectively resist the threat of deep
repackaging attacks. As far as we know, CodeCloak is the
first system to take advantage of virtualization technology to
protect native SO files.
Our evaluations show that CodeCloak can effectively resist
static analysis, dynamic analysis, and even specific attack
methods. Manual dynamic analysis experiments show that
the attack costs of malicious attackers increase exponentially
due to the introduction of diversified virtual machine princi-
ples. Performance experiments show that CodeCloak brings a
small increase in performance overhead, which is acceptable
relative to the importance of the algorithm in the program.
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